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"We got off to a bad start. When I shook hands with him I murmured the little Russian I know which means how are you, and he immediately said to me, 'That's what people say when they haven't got anything else to say.'"

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"I definitely did not feel at ease or anywhere nearly as welcome as I had a year ago. I began to wonder when he was going to swing on me for my writings. As a result I never brought them up during the conversation for I had seen some Soviet-published cracks at me."

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"Finally a response. Mr. Khrushchev suddenly teed off on of all things my suggestion of the gift of a painting. He said as to the question of a loan exhibition of the paintings or even possibly of a purchase of the paintings, that these might be good ideas but, first, basic relations between the countries should be appropriate (whatever that meant). As to their giving us any paintings, "America would suspect an ulterior motive." I quickly reiterated that I had said I was prepared to buy the paintings first and that the gift suggestion was only a subsequent one."

"Mr. Khrushchev continued -- as to Mr. Prince having so few meetings, Mr. Khrushchev personally understood this matter. He was sorry personally but then the reason was that official relations had not been normal for years. He said that the Soviet officials thought that we were only feeling them out and "feeling out doesn't always yield results." Furthermore, the officials were very busy and our trip looked to them like a tourist visit."

"I mentioned to Mr. Khrushchev that Mr. Prince had frequently pointed out that Armour's in Argentina was compelled to sell its meat to the Argentine Government which in turn sold the meat to the Soviet Union and that Mr. Prince and Armour's would naturally prefer to sell meat from their American plant directly to the Soviet Union thereby obtaining dollars instead of pesos, and that he was prepared to enter into contracts on meats and hides, for example, with the Soviet Union if the Soviet officials had so desired. Mr. Khrushchev replied that the trouble was that the Soviet point of view and the American point of view as to what were normal trade relations were quite different. He said: 'We have received suggestions from the United States about the sale of meat, butter and fats. Now these materials we import from other countries but Agriculture and Commerce want manganese. We have no objections to that but this kind of trade amounts to a discrimination, a particular discrimination. Next I may suppose we may expect an offer for uranium, ' and for the first time in the conference he began to grin and look like the old Khrushchev."

"I explained to him that our difficulty I imagined in selling butter was an internal political problem at himselfor the housewives at home would resent it ff American butter were in effect sold cheaper

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to Russian housewives. Mr. Khrushchev either didn't get the pint or disregarded it for the replied: 'If the United States is afraid to sell we are not anxious to buy. We can do without a rich uncle.' Then he added: 'Furthermore, the United States does not ask for just useful goods in exchange, they want strategic goods.

That might be good for Senators McCarthy and Knowland but we are not much taken by it so let the United States Government sell their butter to Senator Knowland, maybe he can get something out of it. Let him try buying on those terms.'"

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Trub OK to USA

"At the present time our relations do not provide the necessary conditions for such a trip. In time he thought there would be improvement in relations and that the United States 'would not be afraid of us' and that then he might be able to come to the United States. 'I believe in time that relations will improve; in time we may be able to send our officials to the United States and there is much to be learned in the United States in its industry and its culture.'"

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"First, the prerequisite for improvement of relations is to establish normal trade relations. That would be a good beginning -- if we can trade and buy and sell freely between our countries. But this should relate to goods which people really want and not just what one wants to sell. Many Americans think we want strategic goods. We want normal relations with all and first and foremost with the United States. The United States has a highly developed industry and a high standard of culture. We wish for normal relations.

"Second, as to the American bases surrounding the Soviet Union the existence of these bases shows the lack of confidence between two
countries. While such bases exist understanding is difficult. When

and then the United States increases its armed forces and spends more and then we increase our armed forces and spend more.

Therefore it would be good to come to terms about how long the United States shall maintain these bases. Molotov has suggested (s0 I understood him to say — I may be wrong on who suggested it, but the rest of the quote is correct) troops should be withdrawn from Germany by both countries. As a beginning they could leave a small part behind while making the withdrawal a gradual one, but all troops should be withdrawn from Germany.

"Third, there should be a reduction of armaments. Because of the armaments race a great burden is put upon all of us, both you and us.

"Fourth, we are a sincere people. This is a peaceful country and we are not taking the initiative to attack. We believe that the production and storage of atomic and hydrogen bombs should be prohibited.

"Fifth, we seek more frequent contacts in the cultural field.

We receive few requests from Americans and we satisfy about all

of them. Our people frequently get no chance to go to the United

States of America. Your college editors came here last year but

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when our editors wanted to go to your country they were refused entry. Now we have another party of men who wish to go to the United States but we receive little help from your country in this matter.

"Sixth, in our country there is a law against aggressive operations and war-like statements. In your country generals and senators babble all the time about dropping atomic bombs, launching wars, etc. That, of course, creates no condition for peaceful understanding. Who makes such statements? You can find them in your papers every day -- do not madmen write this?

"Seventh, as to concessions. We are prepared for mutual concessions. It is silly to try to extract concessions from one side by force. If that side does not want to give them - when that side is a great powerful country such as ours -- we have no interest in making such demands upon the United States."

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"He said: 'What we need is trade. Butter for manganese is blackmail. We need real normal trade; that's the way to begin."

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"The Chinese don't like cruisers and planes close to their shores. They definitely don't like them. The further the United States planes and cruisers are from Chinese shores the better the relations will be. This is true also about the USSR. The further United States forces are from our frontiers the better friendship there will be. I have no authority from the Chinese to make this statement but I think this is so."

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